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COMPLYING WITH NUNEZ: THE NECESSARY
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING FORFEITURE OF
PROPERTY AND AVOIDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY AFTER
STATE V. ESPARZA
MICHELLE R. HAUBERT-BARELA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2000, the New Mexico Supreme Court delivered its opinion in State v.
Nunez,' holding that civil forfeiture under the New Mexico Controlled Substances
Act2 was considered punishment for the purpose of New Mexico's double jeopardy
clause.3 As such, Nunez required criminal prosecutions and civil forfeiture actions
to proceed in a "single, bifurcated proceeding."4 While Nunez was considered by
many to be a radical and unwarranted departure from federal jurisprudence, 5 more
important to New Mexico practitioners was the procedural uncertainty left in its
aftermath.6 State v. Esparza7 marks the first case in which the New Mexico appellate

courts have attempted to determine precisely what procedure is mandated by the
Nunez opinion.8 This Note examines the impact that recent case law and legislation
* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 264.
2. NMSA 1978, §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1997).
94, 2 P.3d at 288; infra notes 36-55 and
3. N.M. CONST. art. 1I, § 15; Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013,
accompanying text.
4. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
5. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 9H 128-72, 2 P.3d at 294-309 (Sema, J., dissenting) (declaring the
majority opinion to be a "radical departure from federal jurisprudence"); Laurel A. Carrier, Criminal
Procedure-Civil Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy:State v. Nunez, 31 N.M. L. REV. 401,401 (2001) (characterizing
the Nunez decision as "unique" and stating that it made New Mexico the "[f]irst state to deviate from federal
jurisprudence regarding double jeopardy with respect to civil forfeiture under the Fifth Amendment"); Janice Greger
Shipon, Double Jeopardy--No Legislative Deference: Civil Forfeitureof Drug Related Property ConstitutesDouble
Jeopardy Under the New Mexico Constitution,32 RUTGERS L.J. 1358, 1358 (2001) (calling Nunez a "controversial
decision" and a "drastic departure from federal double jeopardy analysis").
6. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 105,2 P.3d at 290 ("We are not unmindful that a single proceeding may
pose some logistical or procedural complexities."); infra note 99; see also Carrier, supra note 5, at 418-20
(contemplating the variety of procedural questions that Nunez produced).
7. 2003-NMCA-075, 70 P.3d 762.
8. Prior to Esparza, the New Mexico Supreme Court revisited the issue of civil forfeiture and double
jeopardy in City of Albuquerque ex rel. Albuquerque Police Department v. One 1984 White Chevy, 2002-NMSC014, 46 P.3d 94. However, in White Chevy, the court declined to apply Nunez, stating that the Nunez decision was
limited in its application to the Controlled Substances Act. Id. 9, 46 P.3d at 97. Despite this holding, the court's
analysis in White Chevy followed the reasoning of the Nunez court but found the required forfeiture of a person's
vehicle, after the owner was caught driving the vehicle with a revoked license due to DUI charges, served a remedial
purpose. Id. 1 18, 46 P.3d at 99. Thus, in White Chevy double jeopardy protections were not implicated.
The prosecution of civil forfeiture and criminal charges in a single, bifurcated proceeding, so as to avoid
double jeopardy, has also come before the New Mexico Court of Appeals since its decision in Esparza. See State
v. Brown, 2003-NMCA-1 10, 76 P.3d 1113; State v. Tijerino, 2004-NMCA-039, 87 P.3d 1095. In Brown, the court
did not address whether the state complied with the constitutional requirements mandated in Nunez, holding that
the "Defendant failed to include his forfeiture case as part of the record; without the record of the case, this court
is unable to review his double jeopardy claim." Id. 1 23, 76 P.3d at 1120 (citing S. Union Gas Co. v. Taylor, 82
N.M. 670, 672, 486 P.2d 606, 608 (1971)). In Tijerino, the New Mexico Court of Appeals barred the City of
Albuquerque from pursuing a criminal prosecution after a stipulated order of dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding,
resulting in the loss of the Defendant's Ford vehicle, when the two proceedings were not pursued simultaneously.
Id. 'ft 8-13, 87 P.3d at 1097-98. Yet, since the stipulated judgment was entered on August 21, 2001, and the criminal charges were not filed until October 1, 2001, the court of appeals did not address the specific procedure mandated by Nunez as the City failed to pursue the charges in a single bifurcated proceeding. Id. 1 17, 87 P.3d at 1099.
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has had on the specific procedures for pursuing civil forfeiture in conjunction with
a criminal prosecution. Additionally, this Note suggests that criminal forfeiture is
an alternative to civil forfeiture that the New Mexico Supreme Court and New
Mexico Legislature may have overlooked.
II. BACKGROUND
Forfeiture actions are "statutorily created sanction[s]" 9 that are intended to keep
people who commit crimes from acquiring a profit based upon their wrongdoing. 0
Thus, forfeiture actions are typically used to attain property that was either utilized
to facilitate a crime or is considered to be proceeds of a crime." Civil forfeiture
actions, in contrast to criminal forfeiture, are classified under in rem jurisdiction and
considered to be actions against the property itself and not the property owner.I2
When dealing with civil forfeiture, double jeopardy may be used as a defense to
the subsequent initiation of a criminal prosecution after the conclusion of the
forfeiture proceeding, or vice versa.' 3 Both the Fifth Amendment of the United15
States Constitution 4 and article HI, section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution
protect an individual from being subjected to jeopardy twice for the same offense.
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the federal Double Jeopardy
Clause as providing three distinct protections: (1) "a second prosecution for the

9. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 1 33, 129 N.M. at 74. While civil forfeiture was originally a part of English
common law, modem forfeitures in the United States are solely statutory actions. See Arthur W. Leach & John G.
Malcolm, CriminalForfeiture:An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241
(1994) ("[l]n this country property may only be forfeited if its forfeiture is specifically authorized by statute.").
Under English common law, three types of forfeiture existed. The first, called deodand, required the forfeiture of
all instrumentalities involved in the death of a person. Therefore, if aperson were "killed by a moving cart, the cart
and its horses were [forfeited]...." Id. However, in 1846, England abolished this form of forfeiture. The second type,
forfeiture of the estate, required the automatic forfeiture of a defendant's estate upon conviction of a felony or
treason. While automatic forfeiture was initially used in colonial America, the First Congress did away with the
automatic forfeiture of estate. What remained was statutory forfeiture, which serves as the basis for modem civil
forfeiture laws in the United States. Id. Criminal forfeiture actions are also statutory in nature; however, criminal
forfeiture does not possess the same historical recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States as does civil
forfeiture. Forfeiture of the estate was the English common law antecedent to modem criminal forfeiture. Leach &
Malcolm, supra at 247 n.25 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974)). After
being abolished by the First Congress, criminal forfeiture was not again recognized until 1970. United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 n.7 (1998). Since 1970, Congress has enacted criminal forfeiture statutes in a variety
of different areas to provide an additional deterrence to incarceration. See supra Leach & Malcolm, at 249-53. For
examples of criminal forfeiture statutes, see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Activities, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1970, as amended in 1992), and Crime Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
10. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 9"133, 34, 129 N.M. at 74.
11. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 243, 246.
12. CompareUnited States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that civil forfeiture did not constitute
punishment because of the in rem nature of the proceeding), and Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 246-49 (stating
that in rem forfeiture actions are "directed against property rather than against individuals"), with Bajakajian,524
U.S. at 332 (stating that, "in personam, criminal forfeitures.. have historically been treated as punitive"), and
Douglas Kim, Asset Forfeiture: Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527, 535 (1997)
("Criminal forfeiture is an in personami action. As such, the defendant must be convicted of or plead guilty to
violations of certain federal statutes before the government gains title.").
13. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013,1 31, 2 P.3d at 275.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb....").
15. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15 ("[N]or shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.....
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same offense after acquittal"; 6 (2) "a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction"; 7 and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense."' 8 New Mexico
similarly interprets the state constitution to provide the same protections. 9
While the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same
offense, this protection has been limited to criminal punishments 20 and is further
limited to multiple punishments occurring in successive proceedings. 2' Yet, because
the multiple punishment protection purportedly only applies to criminal punishment,22 much of the debate surrounding the prosecution of criminal charges in
addition to civil forfeiture actions has been centered on what constitutes punishment
for the purposes of double jeopardy. 23 This definition of punishment has been
limited in its scope by the "guilty property" fiction. This fiction is based upon the
in rem nature of the proceeding and the notion that the proceeding is instituted
against the property, and not the property owner.24 The notion that civil forfeitures
are only actions against property, or the "guilty property" fiction, is still adhered to

16. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith,
490 U.S. 794, 803 (1989).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677,678,905 P.2d 715,718 (1995) (citing Swafford v. State, 112 N.M.
3, 7, 810 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1991)) (The United States and New Mexico double jeopardy clauses "protect a defendant
from a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and from multiple punishments for the same offense.").
20. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938) ("Unless this sanction was intended as
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, the double jeopardy clause.. .is not applicable.").
According to the Supreme Court of the United States in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), "the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, 'in common parlance' be
described as punishment." Id. at 99 (quoting United States ex rel.Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)).
Instead, in determining what constitutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court has,
in large part, deferred to congressional intent and statutory construction. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (indicating the
inquiry for the Court is "whether the legislature, 'in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated.. .a preference
of one label or the other'); Ursery, 518 U.S. at 278 (requiring "clearest proof' that a "statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism") (citing
One Assortment of 89 Firearms v. United States, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984)).
21. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). Generally, neither the United States nor the New
Mexico Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits bringing multiple charges against a defendant for the same offense when
the charges are brought in a single proceeding. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) ("[T]he [Double
Jeopardy] Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for.. multiple offenses in a single
prosecution."); State ex rel.
Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 626, 904 P.2d 1044, 1051 (1995) (establishing
that the first factor in multiple punishment analysis is the determination as to whether or not the proceedings were
separate; if they are not separate, then no violation of double jeopardy exists).
22. Despite the distinction made between criminal and civil mechanisms, the multiple punishment protection
has been argued to protect against both criminal charges and civil forfeiture actions for the same offense when
successively tried. See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), United States v. Ursery,
59 F.3d 568 (6th Cit. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); Nunez 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 264; cf. United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that a civil penalty constituted a second punishment under double jeopardy);
Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (finding a civil tax to be punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy).
23. See, e.g., Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Ursery, 518 U.S.
267. For New Mexico cases dealing with punishment and double jeopardy, see, for example, Nunez, 2000-NMSC013, 2 P.3d 264, and State ex rel.
Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995).
24. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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by the Supreme Court of the United States,2 5 despite widespread criticism. 26 By
contending that in rem actions are against the property and that the individual is not
being punished, this fiction allows for both civil forfeiture and criminal charges,
based upon a single offense, to be pursued in separate proceedings without
implicating the multiple punishment protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.27
However, federal law and the law of New Mexico have diverged on this issue.28
Historically, the Supreme Court of the United States has relied heavily on the
"guilty property" fiction to distinguish civil forfeiture actions and civil penalties
from criminal punishment.29 In Various Items of Personal Property v. United

States,3 ° the Supreme Court relied upon the "guilty property" fiction, and the
distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction, to determine whether civil
forfeiture was punitive, and therefore a violation of the multiple punishment
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3' The Court in Various Items held:
A forfeiture proceeding... is in rem. It is the property which is proceeded against,
and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the
wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. The
forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense. The provision of
the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not
32
apply.

The general distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction has remained
a predominant part of the Supreme Court's analysis regarding civil forfeiture
actions. 33 While no longer the only inquiry in determining whether civil forfeiture
is punitive, this distinction evolved into the United States v. Ward 34 test, which

25. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 270-92.
26. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We have repeatedly rejected the idea that the nature of the court's
jurisdiction has any bearing on the constitutional protections that apply at a proceeding before it."); Nunez, 2000NMSC-013, 82, 2 P.3d at 285 ("[1]n New Mexico, we have expressly dismissed the guilty property fiction as
'anachronistic' and not reflective of the true nature of an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding.") (citing State v.
$2730.00, 111 N.M. 746, 748, 809 P.3d 1274, 1276 (1991)); see also Note, DoubleJeopardy Clause-In rem Civil
Forfeiture, 110 HARV. L. REV. 206, 214 (1996) (criticizing ineffectiveness of "guilty property" fiction to justify
many civil forfeiture actions).
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354
(1984); see also Ursery, 518 U.S. at 278 ("Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double Jeopardy Clause
adhere to a remarkably consistent theme... .ln rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.").
30. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
31. Id. at 581.
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., 89 Firearms,465 U.S. 354; Ursery, 518 U.S. 267.
34. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). The Ward test, when applied, creates a presumption that civil forfeiture actions
are remedial, instead of punitive, and makes this presumption extremely difficult to refute. The test calls for two
levels of analysis. The courts first look at the construction of the statute authorizing forfeiture in order to assess
whether Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil or criminal cause of action. Id. 248-49 (citing Hemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)). Under this prong of the Ward test, courts may look at a number of factors,
including the label Congress places on the sanction, id. at 249 (stating that labeling some sanctions as civil and
others as criminal is a clear manifestation of congressional intent to treat the action as a remedial measure), and the
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currently remains the federal test.35
In State v. Nunez, 36 the New Mexico Supreme Court chose to extend the
protection of the state's jeopardy clause to defendants facing criminal charges and
civil forfeiture actions. 37 Thus, the court rejected the federal presumption 38 that civil
forfeiture is remedial, 39 deciding instead that civil forfeiture under the New Mexico
Controlled Substances ActP was punishment for purposes of New Mexico's
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.4 ' In its divergence from federal
jurisprudence, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied upon State v. Gomez42 and the
distinctive characteristics that distinguish New Mexico and federal jurisprudence in
the area of civil forfeiture.43 In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted that
United States v. Ursery marked a "singular reversal of [the United States Supreme
Court's] recent double jeopardy jurisprudence"" upon which New Mexico courts
"procedural mechanisms [Congress] established for enforcing forfeiture under the statute." See 89 Firearms,465
U.S. at 363 ("Congress' intent... is most clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established....").
Procedural mechanisms appear to be the predominate factor in determining the first prong of the Ward test. The
Court, in 89 Firearms,included the nature of the jurisdiction in its analysis of procedural mechanisms stating, "In
contrast to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil
proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon the seizure of a physical object." Id. The reliance of the federal courts
on the "guilty property" fiction makes in rem jurisdiction a crucial aspect of determining the penal or remedial
nature of civil forfeiture.
For the second prong of the test, the courts determine if the civil forfeiture action is .'so punitive.. .as
to negate' Congress' intention." Id. at 365. However, to satisfy the second prong of the test, the Supreme Court held
that "'[o]nly the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice." Id.
35. See, e.g., 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 365; Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288-90.
36. 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 264.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 34.
39. 2000-NMSC-013, 1 84, 2 P.3d at 286.
40. NMSA 1978, §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1997).
41. 2000-NMSC-013, 94, 2 P.3d at 288; see infra note 138.
42. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1. Gomez provides for an interstitial approach when evaluating federal and
state constitutional claims. According to interstitialism, if the right asserted is protected by the federal Constitution
then the state follows federal jurisprudence. Id. 19, 932 P.2d at 7. However, if the right is not protected by the
federal Constitution, then the state court determines if the right is protected by the state constitution. Id. Federal
precedent is deviated from for three reasons: "a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and
federal government, or distinctive state characteristics." Id.
43. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 17, 2 P.3d at 272. The New Mexico Supreme Court noted that the State has
"a time-honored precedent that has always regarded forfeiture as punitive." Id. New Mexico precedent is distinctive
because it stands in direct contrast to the historical federal precedent regarding civil forfeiture as non-punitive. See
supra note 29.
44. Id. 16, 2 P.3d at 272. The recent federal precedent to which the New Mexico Supreme Court refers,
and from which Ursery deviates, is United States v. Halper,490 U.S. 435 (1989), and Departmentof Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994). Both Halper and Kurth Ranch repudiated the Ward test. In Halper, the
government pursued civil penalties following criminal charges that resulted in two years imprisonment and a $5000
fine. 490 U.S. at 437. The United States subsequently filed a civil action based on the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3731 (1994), potentially subjecting Halper to a statutory penalty of over $130,000, even though the actual
loss suffered by the government only amounted to $585. Halper,490 U.S. at 438-39. The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York found that the statutory penalty "exceed[ed] what 'could reasonably be regarded
as the equivalent of compensation for the Government's loss,"' thus constituting punishment. Id. at 439 (quoting
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943)). The Supreme Court
agreed. According to the Court, neither retribution nor deterrence are "legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives." Id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 144, 168 n.20 (1979)). Thus,
"a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment...." Id.
In Kurth Ranch, the defendants were convicted on criminal charges, were required to forfeit $18,016.83
and a variety of farm equipment, and had a civil tax of $900,000 levied against them by the government. 511 U.S.
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had already relied. 45 Thus, to adopt the presumption against double jeopardy protecrequire the New Mexico Supreme Court to "dismantle
tion found in Ursery46 would
47
a significant body of law."
In analyzing the multiple punishment double jeopardy claims in Nunez,48 the New
Mexico Supreme Court relied upon three factors set forth in State ex. rel. Schwartz
v. Kennedy.49 Under the Schwartz analysis, the court looks at "(1) whether the State
subjected the defendant to separate proceedings; (2) whether the conduct.. consisted
of one offense or two offenses; and (3) whether the penalties in each of the proceedings may be considered 'punishment' for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."5
Nunez focused primarily on the third factor of the Schwartz analysis, 5 determining that civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act was punishment for
the purposes of double jeopardy.52 In doing so, the Nunez court rejected the federal
presumption stating, "In New Mexico, the fact that the Legislature has chosen to

at 771-73. Again, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "[a] defendant convicted and punished for an
offense may not have a nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in a separate
proceeding." Id. at 773.
45. The primary New Mexico case that relied upon Halper and Kurth Ranch, prior to Ursery, was State ex
rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995). However, Schwartz has since been relied upon and
cited by a number of New Mexico cases. See, e.g., State v. Borja-Guzman, 1996-NMCA-025, 912 P.2d 277; State
v. Gonzales, 1997-NMCA-039, 940 P.2d 185; State v. Powers, 1998-NMCA-133, 967 P.2d 454.
46. Finding that the circuit courts' reliance on Halperin civil forfeiture cases was misguided, Ursery revived
Ward as the federal test. See 518 U.S. at 287-88. According to the Ursery Court, Halperwas clearly limited to civil
penalties and did not extend to forfeiture actions. Id. In making the distinction between civil penalties and civil
forfeiture actions, the Court relied upon the guilty property fiction, once again, stating:
Since at least Various Items, we have distinguished civil penalties such as fines from civil
forfeiture proceeding that are in rem. While a "civil action to recover.. .penaltie[s] [sic], is
punitive in character," and much like a criminal prosecution in that "[iut is the wrongdoer in
person who is proceeded against.. and punished," in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, "it is the
property which is proceeded against, and by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and
condemned."
Id. at 283. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the Ward test, with its presumption against punishment and double
jeopardy protections, see supra note 34, applied to civil forfeiture actions. But see Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. Although
Ward has been recognized by the Court as the current test for civil forfeitures, the facts of Ward dealt with a civil
penalty and not a civil forfeiture action. Thus, despite the "historical distinction" relied upon by the Court in Ursery,
there is not a particularly clear differentiation between civil forfeiture and civil penalty cases. Id. at 249.
47. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 17, 2 P.3d at 272.
48. Nunez consisted of the consolidated appeals of five separate defendants who had been subjected to both
criminal charges and the civil forfeiture of their property. Id. 1 1, 2 P.3d at 269. Each of the defendants was charged
with violations of the Controlled Substances Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1997). Nunez,1 1, 2 P.3d
at 269-70. The defendants challenged the State's ability to pursue criminal prosecution after acquiring the forfeiture
of defendants' property. Jesus Nunez, Alex Gallegos, Edward Vasquez, and Marguerite Vasquez each suffered a
default judgment in the forfeiture proceeding. Id. 7 3-12, 2 P.3d at 270-71. Nunez was indigent and unable to
obtain counsel, and Gallegos discovered that attorneys fees would be more than the value of the forfeited property.
David Chavez was able to reach a settlement with the State regarding the civil forfeiture action but also contested
7, 8, 2 P.3d at 270.
the subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. 919
49. 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995).
50. Id. at 626, 904 P.2d at 1051.
51. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 919 55-60, 2 P.3d at 280-81. The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that
the first two prongs of the Schwartz test had been satisfied. Id. In its analysis of the first prong, the court concluded
it was clear that the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution had been pursued in two separate proceedings. Id. 1
55, 2 P.3d at 280. As to the second prong, the court found that since the civil forfeiture and criminal charges were
based upon a violation of a single statutory provision and required the same evidence for each charge only one
offense existed. Id. 91 56, 57, 2 P.3d at 280-81 (applying Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
52. 2000-NMSC-013, 1 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
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label a proceeding 'civil' or 'criminal' is not dispositive of the true nature of that
proceeding."53 The Nunez court also rejected the Supreme Court's reliance on the
"guilty property" fiction:
[I]t must not be forgotten that the in rem action is directed, not at the property
itself, but at any interest that may exist in that property, and that when, as the
consequence of a crime, the court divests a defendant, without compensation, of
any interest in property-that defendant has been punished. 4

The court further stated, "Once it is accepted that the purpose of in rem forfeiture
is to target, not the property by itself, but a person's interest in that property, it is
self-evident that the forfeiture is punishment."55
To remedy the constitutional problem presented by the combination of civil
forfeiture and criminal actions, the New Mexico Supreme Court required both civil
forfeiture and criminal actions be brought together in a "single, bifurcated
proceeding. 56 Generally, neither New Mexico nor the federal double jeopardy
clause prohibits bringing multiple charges against a defendant for the same offense
when the charges are united in a single proceeding.57 It is only when a defendant is
punished for an offense and is later punished again for the same offense that double
jeopardy protections against multiple punishments are implicated. Thus, according
to the court in Nunez, a single proceeding is necessary to "eliminate the potential for
double-jeopardy violations."58
Soon after the New Mexico Supreme Court rendered its decision in Nunez, the
state legislature codified the basic requirements the court had established.59 The
Forfeiture Act 60 addressed many of the issues that presented various problems or
concerns in Nunez.61 Most importantly, the statute codified the requirement that the
forfeiture and criminal charge be brought in a single, bifurcated proceeding and that
jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding would lie in the same venue as the
criminal prosecution. 62 Additionally, the statute provided for representation by a

53. Id. 46, 2 P.3d at 278.
54. Id. 84, 2 P.3d at 286.
55. Id. 83, 2 P.3d at 286.
56. Id. 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
57. See supra note 21.
58. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290 (citing Luis Garcia-Rivera, Dodging Double Jeopardy:
Combined Civil and Criminal Trials, 26 STETSON L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1996) ("[Tjhe only feasible way to avoid
double jeopardy is to bring both civil and criminal suits in one combined proceeding.")).
59. See Forfeiture Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (2002); STATE OF N.M., SENATE FINANCE
COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT ON FORFErrURE ACT, S.45-5, at 1 (2002) ("The [Forfeiture Act] codifies the
bifurcated proceeding set forth in State v. Nunez."). However, the legislation passed in 2002 was not the New
Mexico Legislature's first attempt to address the concerns associated with civil forfeiture. A 1996 proposed
forfeiture act included a requirement, similar to that of Nunez, mandating that civil forfeiture and criminal charges
be presented to the same jury in a single, bifurcated proceeding. However, that provision was struck by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and the entire act was later vetoed by the governor. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-0 13, T 2, P.3d
at 313-14 n.31.
60. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (2002).
61. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290 (finding that bringing civil forfeiture and criminal
charges together in a single, bifurcated proceeding "will also remedy some of the other factors that bring into
question the fairness of modem forfeiture. Most notably, the indigent defendant will have available the assistance
of counsel in the forfeiture proceeding....").
62. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C) (2002).
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public defender in civil forfeiture proceedings if a public defender had first been
made available to the defendant in the criminal prosecution.63 The Forfeiture Act
also altered the burden of proof to one of "clear and convincing evidence"' and
required the State to show not only that the property is subject to forfeiture 65 but also
that the criminal charge resulted in a conviction and the value of the forfeited
property is not excessive when compared to the offense.66 It is in light of these
requirements, established in Nunez and codified by the Forfeiture Act, that Esparza
was decided.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
State v. Esparza is three cases that were consolidated for the purpose of appeal.67
Each defendant was charged with violating the New Mexico Controlled Substances
Act. 68 The State, pursuant to the Act, filed both criminal charges and civil forfeiture
actions against each defendant.69 On appeal, each defendant argued that double
jeopardy precluded the State from pursuing both the criminal charge and civil
forfeiture claim unless the two actions were pursued simultaneously. The court of
appeals consolidated these cases to allow for a single determination regarding what
circumstances would bar the state from pursuing both actions according to Nunez. 7°
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the procedures employed by the State
were sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements established in Nunez7 and
constitutional double jeopardy violations existed with
found that no New Mexico
72
regard to the defendants.
A. State v. Esparza
Defendant Esparza was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance after
Hobbs police seized 230 grams of cocaine, in addition to $33,123. 7 3 The State filed
a criminal information against Esparza that contained both the criminal charge and
a complaint for civil forfeiture of the seized currency.7 4 Esparza pled no contest to
the drug trafficking charge.75 However, when the court indicated that the State
would proceed with the civil forfeiture claim, Esparza objected on double jeopardy

63.

NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C)(3) (2002); see also Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 1104, 2 P.3d at 290 ("[T]he

indigent defendant will have available the assistance of counsel in the forfeiture proceeding because both the
property and the criminal actions will take place in a single trial.").
64. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E) (2002).
65. The phrase "subject to forfeiture" typically refers to property that is connected to illegal activity, usually
requiring that the property be an instrumentality or proceed of a crime.
66. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E)(3) (2002). Specifically, the Forfeiture Act requires that the value of the
forfeited property not "unreasonably exceed: (a) the pecuniary gain derived or sought to be derived from the crime;
(b) the pecuniary loss caused or sought to be caused by the crime; or (c) the value of the convicted owner's interest
in the property." Id.
67. 2003-NMCA-075, 9 1, 70 P.3d at 764.
68.

NMSA 1978, §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1997); Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075,

69. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 1 1, 70 P.3d at 764.
70. Id.
71. Id. 9H 24-34, 70 P.3d at 768-70; see supra Part I.B.
1, 70 P.3d at 764.
72. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075,

73. Id. 13, 70 P.3d at 764.
74. Id.

9 3,

70 P.3d at 764-65.

75. Id. 913, 70 P.3d at 765.

911, 70 P.3d at

764.
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grounds arguing that the acceptance of the plea barred the State from seeking
forfeiture.76 The district court concluded that the State had brought the criminal

charge and forfeiture action in a "'single, bifurcated proceeding' as required by
Nunez" ;77 consequently, the
78 civil action proceeded and Esparza was ordered to
forfeit the seized currency.
B. State v. Booth
Defendant Booth was charged and indicted with possession of marijuana and
intent to distribute. 79 The State filed a motion for forfeiture of Booth's vehicle three
days after the indictment. 80 The forfeiture action was filed under the same cause
number as the criminal charge and assigned to the same judge as the criminal
prosecution. 81 A default judgment was later entered in favor of the State on the
forfeiture charge.8 2 Following the default judgment, Booth made a motion to dismiss
the criminal charge on double jeopardy grounds arguing that the forfeiture judgment
precluded the State from subsequently proceeding with the criminal charge. 83 The
district court denied the motion, suggesting instead that Booth move to have the
default judgment set aside. 84 Booth declined to challenge the default judgment for
forfeiture, choosing instead to preserve his double jeopardy claim for appeal.85
Booth pled guilty to the criminal charge against him and was convicted.86
C. State v. Reed
The State charged Defendant Reed with possession of marijuana and intent to
distribute,87 and a month later the Department of Public Safety (DPS) filed a
complaint requesting forfeiture of Reed's vehicle and $2955.94 seized during his
arrest. 88 The forfeiture claim was filed in the district court for Santa Fe County, 89 and
the criminal information was filed later the same month in the district court for
Chaves County by the local district attorney.9' The special assistant attorney general
for DPS filed a motion to consolidate the civil forfeiture claim and the criminal
charge in order to comply with the procedural requirements established in Nunez.
The Santa Fe County district court granted the motion and the forfeiture claim was
redirected to Chaves County. 9 '

76. Id.
77. Id. 4, 70 P.3d at 765 (quoting Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 91104, 2 P.3d at 290).
78. Id.

79. Id. 916, 70 P.3d at 765.
80. Id.
81.

Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. 917, 70 P.3d at 765.
Id. 918, 70 P.3d at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 9 10, 70 P.3d at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Reed's trial was scheduled for July 17, 2001.92 The special assistant attorney
general for DPS did not appear on the day of trial due to a failure to receive
notification. 93 Reed offered to enter a plea of guilty if the court would dismiss the
civil forfeiture claim on DPS's failure to prosecute.9 4 The trial court dismissed the
forfeiture claim over the objections of the district attorney, and Reed pled guilty to
the criminal charge. 95 DPS immediately appealed the ruling, arguing a failure to
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.96 DPS also argued that the dismissal
should not be affirmed on double jeopardy grounds. 97
IV. RATIONALE & ANALYSIS
Nunez provided the Esparza court with little guidance as to the correct procedural
mechanisms necessary to comport with the New Mexico constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. The basic holding in Nunez provided that civil forfeiture
and criminal charges, arising from the same offense, must be pursued in a "single,
bifurcated proceeding. '98 While Nunez noted the procedural quagmire that this may
create, 99 the New Mexico Supreme Court did not specify how prosecutors were to
proceed or exactly what procedure the courts were to require. As a result, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in Esparza attempted to define a "single, bifurcated
proceeding," while looking to the policies underlying double jeopardy in order to
determine if the State of New Mexico complied with Nunez in its prosecution of
defendants Reed, Booth, and Esparza.
A. Single Proceedings
While Nunez failed to explicitly define a single proceeding," ° the opinion did
illustrate what procedures would be considered insufficient. 0' Nunez cited State ex

92. Id. I 11, 70 P.3d at 766.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. 12, 70 P.3d at 766.
97. Id. DPS preemptively raised the double jeopardy claim prior to Defendant Reed. Id. Perhaps the reason
DPS raised the double jeopardy issue was because New Mexico allows for a double jeopardy claim to be raised,
even on appeal, without preservation and does not allow entrance of a guilty plea to waive the right to appeal double
jeopardy claims. Nunez, 2000-NMCA-0 13, U 97-98, 115, 2 P.3d at 289, 292 (referring to NMSA 1978, § 30-1 - 10
(1963)). Hence, the double jeopardy issue remained a viable claim that Defendant Reed could have raised at any
time.
98. Id. 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
99. Id. 1 105, 2 P.3d at 290 ("We are not unmindful that a single proceeding may pose some logistical or
procedural complexities.") (citing Luis Garcia-Rivera, Dodging Double Jeopardy: Combined Civil and Criminal
Trials, 26 STETSON L. REV. 373, 398-404 (1996)). The Garcia-Rivera article notes many differences between
criminal charges and civil forfeiture actions that may create procedural difficulties including: assignment of
"different docket numbers"; "different discovery and procedural rules"; and "different standards of proof." GarciaRivera, supra, at 399.
100. Nunez does cite Garcia-Rivera, supra note 99, at 398, which defines a single proceeding as "one action
in which all claims are brought before the same trier of fact." However, this article was cited by Nunez to illustrate
the complexities of combining civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions and not for its definition of a single
proceeding. But see Stephen H. McClain, Running the Gauntlet: An Assessment of the Double Jeopardy
Implicationsof CriminallyProsecutingDrug Offenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeitureof Related Assets Under 21
U.S.C. § 881(A)(4), (6) and (7), 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 963-65 (1995) (arguing that "civil and criminal

proceedings are always separate proceedings [because] [tihey are simply different in nature").
101. 2000-NMSC-013, 55, 2 P.3d at 280 (rejecting "single, coordinated prosecutions"); see infra notes
105-106 and accompanying text.
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rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy 0 2 as an example of separate proceedings." 3 According to
Schwartz, a civil and criminal action, when "tried at different times before different
fact finders, and.. .resolved by separate judgments" are merely "parallel actions" and
are considered separate for double jeopardy purposes."° The New Mexico Supreme
Court explicitly rejected such parallel actions in Nunez, holding that any attempt to
"[c]ontrive an identity between.. .two proceedings such as that set forth in United
States v. Millan, in which the court asserted that the two actions were both part of
a 'single, coordinated prosecution,"' would not constitute a single proceeding for
purposes of the New Mexico double jeopardy clause. 0 5 Under Millan, a "single,
coordinated proceeding" was determined to exist when (1) "warrants for the civil
seizures and criminal arrests were issued on the same day, by the same judge, based
on the same affidavit"; (2) "the civil complaint incorporated the criminal indictment"; and (3) the defendants were aware of both the civil and criminal proceedings
against them.' °6 Unlike the requirements in Nunez, Millan did not necessitate that
both actions 0be
7 initiated or proceed together in order to avoid double jeopardy
implications.
Following the supreme court's lead, the New Mexico Court of Appeals distinguished Esparza from Millan,0 8 determining that, unlike Millan, the civil forfeiture
and criminal actions had been brought under the same case number and before the
same trier of fact.' 9 While the Esparza court agreed with Defendant Booth's
contention that "the mere act of assign[ing]... a docket number is insufficient, of
itself, to demonstrate that the penalties were sought in a single, bifurcated proceeding," 0 the court found that the procedure was adequate because both charges were
filed under the same case number, heard by the same judge, and initiated prior to
jeopardy attaching."'

102. 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995).
103. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 1146-54, 2 P.3d at 279-80.
104. Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 626, 904 P.2d at 1051.
105. 2000-NMSC-013, 55, 2 P.3d at 280 (citation omitted).
106. 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
107. Id. Millan's "single, coordinated proceeding" has received a great deal of criticism, including criticism
by federal courts. See United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cit. 1994) ("[Ihe position adopted
by the Second Circuit [in Millan] contradicts.. common sense."), rev'd on other grounds, Ursery, 518 U.S. 267
(1996).
108. Esparza,2003-NMCA-075, T131-33,70 P.3d at 769-70. The Esparza court distinguished the procedure
used in the cases against defendants Reed, Booth, and Esparza from the procedure followed in Millan to illustrate
that the procedure used in the Esparzacases was not considered insufficient under Nunez. See supra notes 100-107
and accompanying text. The court distinguished Esparza from Milan based upon several factors including the
shorter lapse in time between the filing of the criminal prosecution and civil action in Esparza, the fact that both
proceedings were before the same judge, and because the State made a good faith attempt to comply with the
procedural requirements. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 'ft 31-33, 70 P.3d at 769-70.

109. 2003-NMCA-075, j 24-30, 70 P.3d at 768-69.
110. Id. 1 27, 70 P.3d at 769; Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Booth at 9, Esparza (No. 23,118) (citing Village
of Deming v. Marquez, 74 N.M. 747, 749, 398 P.2d 266, 267 (1965) (holding that the clerk assigning a criminal

case a civil docket number did not change the nature of the case or the court from treating the case as a criminal
matter)).
111. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 1 27, 70 P.3d at 769. The Esparzacourt specifically stated that acceptance
of a plea does not signal the attachment of jeopardy, as would the entry of a sentence in a criminal prosecution or
a default judgment in a civil forfeiture action. Id. int 16-17, 70 P.3d at 767. Nunez addressed the attachment of
jeopardy in both civil and criminal proceedings:
In a criminal trial, jeopardy attaches at the moment the trier of fact is empowered to make any
determination regarding the defendant's innocence or guilt. In a nonjury trial, this means that

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

The defendants also argued that the timing of each judgment was critical, and that
to conclude either the civil forfeiture or criminal prosecution prior to the other
proceeding violated the requirements of Nunez.1 2 According to Defendant Esparza,
"The proper procedure envisioned by the [clourt in Nunez would dictate the [c]ourt
to refrain from any acceptance of a plea if the issue of the forfeiture is at question
and until it is resolved in order to avoid the clearly stated and defined issues of
jeopardy."1 3 The basis for this argument is that upon the acceptance of a plea or, in
Booth's case, the entrance of a default judgment, jeopardy attaches thereby barring
any subsequent proceedings.'
Yet, Esparza held that, while timing was crucial, it was not the timing of each
judgment that was determinative, but the timing involved in the initiation of the two
claims." 5 Proper initiation, according to the court, requires that both the civil
forfeiture and criminal charge be brought together, or consolidated, prior to the
attachment of jeopardy." 6 Once the proceedings are jointly initiated, "[a] decision
by a district court to dispose of either the forfeiture claim or the criminal charges
prior to the resolution of the entire case will not foreclose the imposition of the
remaining penalty." ' 1 7 Thus, Esparza concluded that Nunez only requires the
"proper initiation of the dual penalty proceeding,"' 8 and, once properly initiated in
jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear at least some evidence on behalf of the state. In
a jury trial, jeopardy attaches at the point when a jury is impaneled and sworn to try the case. In
the case of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, jeopardy attaches at the time the court
.[J]eopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture proceeding at the time the
accepts the defendant's plea...
court enters its final judgment, either at the conclusion of a trial or upon entering a default
judgment.
Nunez, 2003-NMSC-013, 1 28, 2 P.3d at 274-75 (citations omitted). But see State v. Angel, 2002-NMSC-025, 51
P.3d 1155. Angel found that the determination made in Nunez regarding the attachment ofjeopardy in criminal cases
was unnecessary. Id. 1 10, 51 P.3d at 1158. Instead, Angel held that "j]eopardy attaches when the court enters a
judgment and imposes a sentence on the guilty plea, not when the plea was accepted." Id.
112. Defendants Esparza and Booth argued that the acceptance of a plea or the entrance of a default judgment
causes jeopardy to attach, consequently barring any future proceedings. See Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Esparza
at 7-9, Esparza (No. 22,744); Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Booth at 5-10, Esparza (No. 23,118). The procedure
advocated by both defendants would require that the court time the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution so that
the proceedings conclude simultaneously in a single judgment. See id.
Defendant Reed argued that consolidation subsequent to the filing of the criminal prosecution and civil
forfeiture claim violated Nunez, advocating that the two claims must be "brought only in a single bifurcated
proceeding." Appellee Reed's Answer Brief at 2, Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075 (22,582) (quoting Nunez, 2000NMSC-0 13, 1 104, 2 P.3d at 290) (emphasis added).
113. Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Esparza at 9, Esparza (No. 22,744). Similarly, Defendant Booth argued that
the criminal charges and forfeiture actions be resolved in "one trial at which all issues of fact are decided and
[resulting in] one judgment in which all punishments are given." Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Booth at 8, Esparza
(No. 23,118); see also supra notes 111-112.
114. Supranotes 111-112.
of
115. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 20, 70 P.3d at767 ("Nunez appears to mandate only proper initiation
the dual penalty proceeding, meaning that the criminal charges and the forfeiture proceeding must be merged or
consolidated prior to the occurrence of any event that signals the attachment of jeopardy.").
116. Id.; see supra notes 111-112. Defendant Reed argued that the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution
against him were improperly initiated. However, because the civil forfeiture and the criminal prosecution were
consolidated prior to the attachment of jeopardy, the Esparza court rejected Reed's argument. 2003-NMCA-075,
37, 70 P.3d at770.
determination with
117. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 20, 70 P.3d at767. The court of appeals supported this
or a default
ineither a trial
resulting
forfeiture ispursued first,
"ifthe civil
language taken from Nunez stating,
judgment, thedouble-jeopardy defense would arise upon the subsequent initiation of a criminal proceeding." 2000NMSC-013, 31, 2 P.3d at275 (emphasis added).
118. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 20, 70 P.3d at767.
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a single proceeding, Nunez does not prohibit the prosecution of multiple charges but
only the subsequent prosecution of a criminal charge or civil forfeiture action." 9
The Esparza court could have also relied upon the Forfeiture Act 21 to support
this conclusion. Under the Act, a criminal conviction is required as an element of
proof in establishing that forfeiture is necessary.' 2' The statute defines a criminal
conviction as existing when "a person has been found guilty of a crime in the trial
court whether by plea of guilty or nolo contendere or otherwise."' 2 2 Additionally,
both Nunez and the Forfeiture Act require that the criminal prosecution and civil
forfeiture action be bifurcated and tried separately.' 23 By requiring a finding of guilt,
either by a plea or verdict, in a bifurcated proceeding,124 the legislature requires that
the criminal proceeding conclude individually, and prior to, the civil forfeiture
action. 125 Thus, Defendant Esparza's suggested procedure, requiring the court to
refrain from accepting a plea until the forfeiture issue
is decided, cannot be
26
accommodated in light of the legislative requirements. 1
B. Bifurcation
In addition to the requirement of a single proceeding, both Nunez and the
Forfeiture Act require that the criminal prosecution and the civil forfeiture action be
bifurcated and proceed separately. 127 This requirement to bifurcate provided the
Esparza court with another ground upon which to reject the defendants' timing
argument. 128 Specifically, the Esparza court found that requiring both the civil
forfeiture action and the criminal charge to be tried and concluded
simultaneously
29
would fail to comport with the policies underlying bifurcation. 1
The court noted that requiring the claims to proceed simultaneously would
"impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their

119. Id. (citing Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 31, 2 P.3d at 275).
120. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (2002).
121. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E)(2) (2002).
122. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-3(A) (2002).
123. See NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C) (2002); Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013,
104-05, 2 P.3d at 290; see also
infra Part W.B.
124. See infra Part IV.B.
125. The requirement established in Nunez, and codified by the Forfeiture Act, that the civil and criminal
claims be bifurcated and thus tried separately will not allow for the criminal and civil charges to be concluded
simultaneously when paired with the conviction requirement. See NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C) (2002); Nunez, 2000NMSC-013,
104-05, 2 P.3d at 290.
126. Even if the requirements of the Forfeiture Act could be met by a finding of guilt by judge or jury, without
the entrance of a judgment, the trial court could not refrain from the acceptance of a plea, as Defendant Esparza
argues. See Brief-in-Chief for Appellant Esparza at 7-9, Esparaza (No. 22,744). If guilt is not determined based
upon findings by the judge or jury, then there must at least be the acceptance of a plea to meet the "conviction"
requirement of the Forfeiture Act. See NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E)(2) (2002).
127. See supra note 125; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1510 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a bifurcated trial

as "[a] trial that is divided into two stages, such as for guilt and punishment or for liability and damages.-Also
termed two-stage trial.").
128. Defendants' timing argument is discussed in the preceding section. See supra notes 112-119 and
accompanying text.
129. 2003-NMCA-075, 21, 70 P.3d at 767-68. According to Esparza, the purpose of bifurcation is "the
expeditious and economical resolution of cases that involve disparate procedural or substantive issues." Id. The
court found that requiring the criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture action to proceed simultaneously would not
further the policy of preserving judicial resources. Id. 21, 70 P.3d at 768.
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dockets."' 3 ° After the requirements set forth in Nunez, however, this argument is no
longer persuasive. The mandate by Nunez of a "single, bifurcated proceeding" and
the additional requirements codified by the Forfeiture Act 13 eliminate the discretion
trial court judges would otherwise possess to determine how civil forfeiture and
criminal proceedings, arising from the same offense, will proceed through the
courts. Nunez specifically prohibits civil forfeiture and criminal prosecutions arising
from the same offense from being brought in separate proceedings, and, yet, by
requiring bifurcation, Nunez also prohibits the claims from being tried at the same
time. 132 In noting that requiring both actions to proceed simultaneously would
improperly hinder trial court judges from controlling their own dockets, the Esparza
court failed to acknowledge that the requirements of Nunez and the Forfeiture Act
already result in severe limitations upon the discretion of trial court judges.
There are, however, policy reasons associated with bifurcation that provide a
stronger foundation for the court's argument. One purpose of bifurcation mentioned
by the court of appeals was the ability of the trial court to preserve judicial resources
by trying specific issues separately. 3 3 Bifurcation, when at the discretion of a trial
judge, 134 is considered appropriate if the "resolution of [a] particular issue may
expedite or end the litigation."'35 Thus, bifurcation is often used when one issue may
be dispositive of the case as a whole. 136 One example of bifurcation is the separation
of liability and damages in civil actions. Being dispositive, the liability portion of
the trial is pursued first, because if no liability is found, a trial on damages becomes
unnecessary. 137 Under the New Mexico Forfeiture Act, a criminal conviction is
necessary to acquire the forfeiture of property seized for a violation of the
Controlled Substances Act. 3 8 Thus, since a criminal conviction is required as an
130. Id. 1 21, 70 P.3d at 768 (citing State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, 1 28, 968 P.2d 328).
131. Specifically, the Forfeiture Act requires that (1) the criminal prosecutions and civil forfeiture actions be
before the same trier of fact, (2) the claims are bifurcated, and (3) the criminal prosecution proceed prior to the civil
forfeiture action. NMSA 1978, § 31-28-6(B)-(E) (2002); see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
132. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
133. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 21, 70 P.3d at 768 (citing Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 119 N.M.
355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)).
134. Bifurcation is typically a matter of discretion for the trial court judge. See Bolton, 119 N.M. at 361, 890
P.2d at 814 ("The decision.. .to bifurcate the trial... is entrusted to the sound discretion of the [trial] court.") (citing
McCrary v. Bill McCarty Constr. Co., 92 N.M. 552, 554, 591 P.2d 683, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979)). However, in
New Mexico, the requirement to bifurcate civil forfeiture claims and criminal charges is mandated by Nunez and
the Forfeiture Act. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C) (2002); Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, N 104-05, 2 P.3d at 290.
135. Bolton, 119 N.M. at 361, 890 P.2d at 814 (citing Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277, 279, 299
P.2d 457, 458 (1956)).
136. "[I1f one issue at trial may be dispositive, the [judgel has authority to bifurcate the trial and first litigate
the possibly dispositive issue." Yadon v. Quinoco Petroleum, Inc., 114 N.M. 808, 812, 845 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1992).
For examples of bifurcation used to promote judicial economy by resolving dispositive issues first, see Martinez
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 120 N.M. 118, 898 P.2d 1256 (1995) (separating liability portion of trial from damages), and
Ratzlaffv. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 98 N.M. 159, 162, 646 P.2d 586, 589 (1982) (bifurcating trial into two
phases: (1)determining validity of a release alleviating employer from all future responsibility and (2) evaluating
worker's compensation claim).
137. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee, 120 N.M. 118, 898 P.2d 1256.
138. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E). While Nunez only deals with the New Mexico Controlled Substances Act,
NMSA 1978, §§ 30-31-1 to 30-31-41 (1997), the Forfeiture Act also addresses property seized pursuant to other
legislation. See NMSA 1978, § 31-27-1 notes (listing other statutes to which the Forfeiture Act applies including
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, § 30-31A-10 (2002), and Racketeering Act § 3042-4 (2002)). However, there
is no indication that the Forfeiture Act applies to city ordinances, as seen in City ofAlbuquerque ex rel. Albuquerque
Police Department v. One 1984 White Chevy, 2002-NMSC-014, 46 P.3d 94.
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element of proof in the forfeiture proceeding, the criminal prosecution, being
dispositive, should be tried first in order to preserve judicial resources.' 39
The New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure provide an additional basis that
Esparza could have relied upon to refute the defendants' argument that the
bifurcated proceeding end in a single judgment.'4° While the rules of civil procedure
may envision bifurcated proceedings concluding in a single judgment,' 4' a single
judgment in a bifurcated proceeding is not mandatory. 42 In fact, New Mexico Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(B)(1) provides an exception to entering a single judgment,
allowing a trial court judge to enter a judgment in a multiple claim lawsuit that does
not resolve all of the existing claims. 143 Absent Rule 54(B)(1), the trier of fact is still
permitted to issue multiple judgments in a single proceeding with multiple claims;
however, those decisions are not considered final for the purpose of appeal." Rule
non-final orders may be revised any time prior
54(B)(1) expressly states that these
45
to the entry of a final judgment.

139. Although a criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture action will be predicated on much of the same
evidence, any waste of judicial resources will be minimized due to the Forfeiture Act's requirement that both parts
of the proceeding be presented to the same trier of fact. See NMSA 1978 § 31-27-6(C) (2002).
140. When speaking of bifurcation, reliance upon the rules of civil procedure is necessary. Although
bifurcation is often used in criminal cases, see, e.g., State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969 (1983) (explaining
that bifurcation of guilt and sentencing in a capital case is statutorily required), the rules of criminal procedure only
provide for severance. See generally Rule 5-203(C) NMRA 2004. Within the rules of civil procedure there is a clear
distinction intended between severance and bifurcation. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MiLLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387 (2d ed. 1987). Once severed, the resulting two proceedings are considered
completely independent of one another, while bifurcation is considered to still be one proceeding with two stages
or trials. Id.
141. See Rule 1-042 NMRA 2004; FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Wright, supra note 140 (stating, "Separate trials
[under FRCP 42(b)] usually result in one judgment"). New Mexico Rule 1-042(b) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b) are essentially the same in terms of content; hence, reliance upon Federal Rule 42(b) is warranted.
Compare Rule 1-042(b) NMRA 2004, stating:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be
conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving the right of trial by jury
given to any party as a constitutional right.
with FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), stating:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be
conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial
by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
142. See Rule 1-054(B)(1) NMRA 2004.
[Wlhen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, the court may enter a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims only upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay. In the absence of such determination, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the judgment adjudicating all the claims.
Id.
143. Id.; see, e.g., Kerr-McGee, 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204 (finding that it was within the trial court's
discretion to enter a final judgment in a worker's compensation case regarding an injury occurring in 1977 but
leaving for further consideration a claim regarding a 1971 injury).
144. See Rule 1-054(B)(1) NMRA 2004.
145. Id.
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Based upon the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 the court of appeals
could have refuted the defendants' contention that the bifurcated proceeding must
end in a single judgment on two grounds. First, while a bifurcated proceeding may
end in a single judgment, the rules of civil procedure include other ways in which
a bifurcated proceeding may conclude. 147 Although the defendants argue that Nunez
requires a bifurcated proceeding ending in a single judgment,
48 nothing in Nunez or
the rules governing bifurcation mandate such a procedure.
Second, there is also good reason to advocate that each claim, the criminal
prosecution and the civil forfeiture, conclude in independent final judgments. Rule
54(B)(1) allows for the revision of any non-final order until the time at which a final
judgment is made. 149 However, the Forfeiture Act requires a "conviction" in the
criminal prosecution in order to obtain the civil forfeiture of defendant's property. 5 °
Assuming that the criminal prosecution is first, if the decision in the criminal
proceeding were revised, this could bear directly on the outcome of, or even the
need for, a civil forfeiture hearing. Thus, to refrain from entering a final judgment
in the criminal proceeding could result in a waste of judicial
resources and possibly
5
subject defendants to potentially unnecessary legal fees.' '
C. Policies Underlying Double Jeopardy
Finally, the Esparza court held that, while the procedure implemented by the
State in its prosecution of defendants Reed, Booth, and Esparza was not perfect, it
was sufficient to avoid the state constitutional implications associated with double
jeopardy. 5 2 While Nunez found that trying civil forfeiture and criminal prosecutions
separately was a violation of double jeopardy,'53 the New Mexico Supreme Court
did not expressly state what underlying policy aspects of double jeopardy were
being violated. Hence, the Esparza court inferred that Nunez was concerned primarily with defendants' lack of proper notice, or expectation of finality, and the fact
that defendants were being
subjected to multiple trials--common policies under15
lying double jeopardy.

146.

See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.

147. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
148. The Esparza court rejected the defendants' argument for a single judgment on the grounds that it would
violate the policies underlying bifurcation; however, the court did not specify those policies. 2003-NMCA-075,
21, 70 P.3d at 767-68. The argument made above is just one that would be encompassed by the court's general
determination.
149.

See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.

150. See Forfeiture Act, NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E)(2) (2002); supra text accompanying notes 66 and
121-122.
151.

This argument assumes that the defendant would be paying for legal counsel. Under the Forfeiture Act,

indigent defendants that receive state-paid counsel in the criminal proceeding may also receive a public defender
in the civil forfeiture proceeding. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C)(3) (2002). Although indigent defendants may not be
subjected to the extra cost, the State would still bear the burden of potentially unnecessary legal fees.
152. 2003-NMCA-075, (H 28, 34, 10 P.3d at 769, 770.
153.

2000-NMSC-013,

117,2 P.3d at 293.

154. Esparza relied upon the policies commonly understood to "underl[ie] the prohibition against double
jeopardy" to determine if the State had complied with the requirements of Nunez. 2003-NMCA-075, 26, 70 P.3d
at 769. The policy concerns regarding double jeopardy upon which Esparza relied, including finality and the
"expense, embarrassment and ordeal of repeated trials," are largely undisputed. Id. 26, 70 P.3d at 769; see United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978) ("The origin and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause are hardly a matter
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With regard to finality, the Esparza court determined that Nunez was concerned
with defendants being subjected to either a civil forfeiture or criminal prosecution,
after which the defendant had the understanding that the punishment stemming from
their offense was complete, when it was not.'55 The requirement of a single,
bifurcated proceeding serves to protect defendants from the surprise of a second
proceeding in the future. By requiring that criminal charges and civil forfeiture be
jointly sought, the New Mexico Supreme Court ensured that defendants were on
notice to all charges and penalties pending against them, including related forfeiture
claims derived from a single offense.
According to Esparza, the Nunez court also intended to protect defendants from
being "subjected to the 'expense, embarrassment and ordeal of repeated trials."" 56
Prior to Nunez, prosecutors were able to take advantage of the lower burden of proof
and more lenient evidentiary rules found in civil forfeiture proceedings. 57 Prosecutors could try the criminal charge first and, if unable to get a conviction or plea, try
again using a civil forfeiture proceeding with a much lower burden.1 58 Nunez, and
the subsequent Forfeiture Act, attempted to remedy this situation by requiring a
higher burden of proof in civil forfeiture cases, 159 shifting from preponderance to
clear and convincing evidence, 6 ' in addition to requiring a criminal conviction as
an element of proof in obtaining forfeiture.' 6 '

of dispute."). Scott described the generally recognized purpose of the prohibition against double jeopardy, by
quoting Green v. United States:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 671-72, 712 P.2d 13, 17-18 (1986) ("The
purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition in both the state and federal constitutions is to prevent the government
from harassing citizens by subjecting them to multiple suits until a conviction is reached, or from repeatedly
subjecting citizens to the expense, embarrassment and ordeal of repeated trials.").
155. See Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 26, 70 P.3d at 768.
156. Id. 1 26, 70 P.3d at 769 (citing State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 671, 712 P.2d 13, 17 (N.M. Ct. App.
1985)).
157. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, Hj108-11, 2 P.3d at 291-92. The Nunez court expressed concern with the ease
at which prosecutors could obtain the forfeiture of personal property. Specifically, the court noted that forfeiture
proceedings begin with a "virtual presumption that the confiscation was proper." Id. 1 109, 2 P.3d at 291. In addition
to the State having a much lower burden of proof, that burden could be met with evidence typically inadmissible
in a criminal case. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court also expressed concerns regarding other aspects of the civil
nature of forfeiture proceedings, indicating that there are significantly less safeguards found in civil forfeiture
proceedings including those "protections that are indispensable in a criminal setting-such as...the right to counsel,
presumption of innocence, [and] the right to confront one's accusers." Id. See generally Leach & Malcolm, supra
note 9 (criticizing civil forfeiture and discussing the advantages of criminal forfeiture).
158. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.10 (1989) ("[W]hen the Government already has
imposed a criminal penalty and seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against the possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment because it is
dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first proceeding.").
159. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013,
106-10, 2 P.3d at 290-291 (holding that the State will bear a burden of
clear and convincing evidence in place of the typically lower burden of "either probable cause or preponderance
of the evidence").
160. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E) (2002); Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 110, 2 P.3d at 291.
161. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E) (2002); Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 110, 2 P.3d at 291.
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The Esparza court found that these basic double jeopardy protections were
safeguarded through the procedures followed by the State. Each defendant was
afforded notice of all of the charges and penalties levied against them, including
related civil forfeiture claims, and each defendant was only subjected to a single
proceeding and not the cost or inconvenience of multiple trials. 62 However, it was
not solely upon the avoidance of double jeopardy implications that the Esparza
decision rested. Without creating a "good faith" exception per se, 63 Esparza suggested that the intent of prosecutors to comply with the Nunez requirements would
be taken into consideration by the court. 64 The Esparza court held that, because
prosecutors made a good faith effort to comply with Nunez, "[tihe State should [not]
be denied its right to a full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated
the law."'165 Thus, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that no double jeopardy
violations existed.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In the aftermath of Nunez there was concern regarding the procedural uncertainty
that remained. 66 While Esparza addressed some of these uncertainties, it did not
provide an exact procedure for prosecutors to follow. Hence, the ambiguity that was
created by Nunez still persists, to some degree, in Esparza. Yet, much of the procedural uncertainty that remains is not only warranted, but beneficial. Esparza's
failure to provide an exact procedure for prosecutors to follow ensures a sufficient
amount7 of flexibility for prosecutors to cope with a variety of procedural situa6
tions.
16
The Esparza court's reliance on the intent of prosecutors to comply with Nunez
also serves the same purpose by providing procedural flexibility. While there may
be some disagreement with the use of a good faith exception when dealing with
constitutional protections, 169 Esparza's reliance on the intent of prosecutors only

162. Esparza,2003-NMCA-075, f 26, 28, 70 P.3d at 768-69.
163. Cf.United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984). Leon established the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule holding:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence
obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The good faith exception in Leon allows for what would otherwise be an infringement of constitutional
protections, because law enforcement had a reasonable belief that they had complied with the requirements of a
lawful search and seizure. Id. at 919-20. In contrast, Esparzarequires compliance with the constitutional protections
of double jeopardy, only factoring in the intent of prosecutors to comply with Nunez when procedural nuances are
involved. 2003-NMCA-075, ]fi
33, 34, 70 P.3d at 770. The assertion that Esparza is not extending a good faith
exception, per se, to the Nunez requirements seems clear when viewed in light of the New Mexico Supreme Court's
refusal to adopt United States v. Leon and apply a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Gutierrez.
116 N.M. 431, 447, 863 P.2d 1052, 1066-68 (1993).
164. See Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, TIf 33, 34, 70 P.3d at 770.
165. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 9 34, 70 P.3d at 770.
166. See Carriersupra note 5, at 418-20.
167. While Esparza has provided prosecutors a certain amount of flexibility, the courts will still review the
procedure to make sure the prohibition against double jeopardy remains intact.
168. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 'ft 33, 34, 70 P.3d at 770.
169. While the Esparzadecision has not been criticized for its use of intent, other cases have. See, e.g., United
States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (W.D.Wash. 1994), affid by 959 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
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reinforces the position that the courts will not restrict the State's ability to prosecute
due to procedural nuances. 7 There is no indication that the Esparzacourt meant for
the State's intent, alone, to be sufficient to protect against double jeopardy; instead,
the court only relied on intent after it had ensured that the basic protections
associated with double jeopardy had been satisfied.17' With regard to Nunez and
Esparza,it appears that the intention of the courts was to produce a system in which
prosecutors are encouraged to establish procedures that incorporate the ideals and
protections of double jeopardy, rather than placing the burden on the courts to create
a specific procedure to which prosecutors should adhere.7 7 Based upon the
procedures followed in the prosecution of Esparza, Reed, and Booth, it appears that
Nunez was successful in accomplishing this goal.
Procedurally, Esparza established that, in order to comply with Nunez, civil
forfeiture and criminal charges must be pursued in a single proceeding, 173 requiring
that both claims be initiated together or consolidated prior to the attachment of
jeopardy 174 and be heard by the same trier of fact. 171 If properly initiated, the civil
forfeiture and criminal charges may proceed and conclude independently. Beyond
the general requirements established in Nunez and Esparza, the process of trying
criminal prosecutions and civil forfeitures in a single, bifurcated proceeding would
17 6
be more efficient if the criminal prosecution, required as an element of forfeiture,
was required to proceed prior to the civil forfeiture action. 77 However, both case
law 78 and legislation 179 could have easily provided further protection and a clearer
procedural process by requiring criminal forfeiture in the place of civil forfeiture.
Nunez and the Forfeiture Act altered the face of civil forfeiture in New Mexico
in many ways. Most importantly, Nunez found that civil forfeiture under the New

that "a prosecutor's state of mind cannot determine whether a defendant has been placed twice in jeopardy"). The
McCaslin court expressly refuted any reliance on the intent of prosecutors when determining if civil forfeiture and
criminal charges had been pursued in a single proceeding. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In United States v. Leon, Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the majority's
decision to provide a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, excluding evidence obtained through an illegal
search, stating, "Although the self-restraint and care exhibited by the officers in this case is commendable, that alone
can never be a sufficient protection for constitutional liberties." Id. at 948 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
However, both United States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11 th Cir. 1994), and Milian, 2
F.3d at 20-21, found no double jeopardy violations because a single, coordinated proceeding existed in which there
was no indication that the prosecution acted abusively. See McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. at 1305 ("The government acted
abusively by seeking a second punishment because of dissatisfaction with the punishment levied in the first
action.").
170. See Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 34, 70 P.3d at 770.
171. Id.
172. Cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Leon provides a discussion of systematic
deterrence regarding the Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure. Id. The exclusionary rule,
according to the dissent in Leon, was created not to deter specific police officers, but to create a system in which
police officers were trained to acquire a valid warrant and were aware of the consequences for failing to do so. Id.
In essence, the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to create a system in which the respect for Fourth Amendment
ideals was incorporated into the system itself. Id.
173. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 1 20, 26-28, 70 P.3d at 767-69.
174. Id. 20, 70 P.3d at 767.
175. Id.
176. Forfeiture Act, NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E) (2002).
177. See supra notes 120-126.
178. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 264; Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, 70 P.3d 762.
179. Forfeiture Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (2002).
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Mexico Controlled Substances Act constituted punishment.' ° In light of this
finding, the New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Legislature changed
various aspects of civil forfeiture, resulting in a procedure that bears a stronger
resemblance to criminal forfeiture.' 8 '
Civil forfeiture has been distinguished from criminal forfeiture on several
different grounds.8 2 After Nunez and the Forfeiture Act, however, the distinction
between civil and criminal forfeiture in New Mexico is no longer clear. One
significant distinction is that criminal forfeiture is perceived as in personam
jurisdiction, while civil forfeiture is still often classified as a proceeding in rem."'
Yet, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Nunez, rejected the classification of civil
forfeiture as in rem, instead finding that it was the person and not merely the
property that was proceeded against. '4
Another distinction between criminal and civil forfeiture is the burden of proof,
including both the requisite level of proof necessary and the party bearing that
burden. 8 ' Following Nunez and the Forfeiture Act, the State must now bear the
burden in proving that forfeiture is warranted,8 6 just as the State would in criminal
forfeiture proceedings. 8 7 Prior to Nunez, the State was only required to show a
reasonable belief that the property was used in connection with, or was the proceeds
of, a crime. 8 The burden then shifted to the defendant to prove that the property
should be retained, requiring the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property was not subject to forfeiture. 189
In addition to shifting the burden of proof, Nunez also elevated the burden placed
on the State in obtaining civil forfeiture from probable cause to clear and convincing
evidence.'9° Yet, in criminal forfeiture cases, the government's burden, determined
by statute, ranges from a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable
doubt. 'Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court created a higher burden of proof for
civil forfeiture actions pursued in conjunction with criminal prosecutions than is
required in some federal criminal forfeitures. 92 Furthermore, the Forfeiture Act's

180. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290.
181. See generally Kim, supra note 12.
182. Id. at 535-42 (defining criminal and civil forfeiture); see generally Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at
253--64 (comparing criminal and civil forfeiture).
183. Kim, supra note 12, at 535-39; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
184. 2000-NMSC-013, 104, 2 P.3d at 290; see supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
185. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 254-57.
186. NMSA 1978, §31-27-6(E) (2002); Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 110, 2 P.3d at 291.
187. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 264.
188. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013,
106-11, 2 P.3d at 290-92; see also Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at
254-57.
189. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 711106-11, 2 P.3d at 290-92; see supra note 65.
190. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 110, 2 P.3d at 291.
191. See Kim, supra note 12, at 536-38. There has been some debate over what standard of proof the
government must bear in criminal forfeiture cases. The general rule is that if the criminal forfeiture is considered
part of the substantive offense, then proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies. Id. However, if Congress clearly
intends the forfeiture to be part of the sentencing, then the burden is lowered to preponderance of the evidence. Id.
Yet, regardless of whether the criminal forfeiture is part of the substantive offense or merely sentencing, the
underlying criminal charge must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. id.; see also Leach & Malcolm, supra
note 9, at 264-65 n.102.
192. See Kim, supranote 12, at 537-38. Reliance on the burden of proof in federal criminal forfeiture statutes
is necessary because New Mexico has not yet enacted any criminal forfeiture statutes of its own.
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requirement that a criminal conviction be obtained as an element of forfeiture"' is
analogous to the requirement of94 a plea or finding of guilt necessary to obtain the
criminal forfeiture of property.
A transition to criminal forfeiture in New Mexico would also extend protection
to defendants against default judgments in civil forfeiture cases. 19 5 The Forfeiture
Act specifies that the respective rules of procedure 96 will apply in each proceeding,
thus allowing for default judgments in civil forfeiture actions. 97 Under these
circumstances, default judgments allow the State to acquire the forfeiture of
property, without requiring the State to prove its case, when such forfeiture is
considered to be punishment. 98 Thus, a default judgment allows the forfeiture of
property merely upon a defendant's failure to appear. 99 However, by switching to
criminal forfeiture, default judgments would no longer be permitted.
Nor would switching to criminal forfeiture, in place of the current civil forfeiture
requirements, dramatically displace the procedure set forth in Nunez and the Forfeiture Act. As previously mentioned, the combined procedure of Nunez and the Forfeiture Act has created a civil forfeiture system that bears a strong resemblance to
criminal forfeiture.2" Hence, the burden of proof, the requirement of a conviction,
and the in personam nature of the proceeding would all remain intact.
Conversely, the aspects of the process that would be changed by switching to
criminal forfeiture would create a much clearer procedural process. Problems
associated with the initiation or consolidation of criminal charges and forfeiture
actions prior to the attachment of jeopardy" ° would be eliminated. Also, criminal
forfeiture would require that any property the State wants the defendant to forfeit be
included in the criminal information." 2

193. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(E)(2) (2002).
194. Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 264-65 ("Before a judge can enter an order of criminal forfeiture,
the trier of fact must first convict the defendant....").
195. Nothing in Esparzasuggests that the court intended to prohibit defaultjudgments. In Esparza, Defendant
Booth was subjected to a default judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding against him due to his failure to appear.
The court did not treat the entry of a default judgment, in Booth's case, any differently from the acceptance of a plea
in Defendant Esparza's case. 2003-NMCA-075, 27, 70 P.3d at 769.
196. The Forfeiture Act requires that the rules of civil procedure apply in the civil forfeiture hearing, and the
rules of criminal procedure apply in the criminal prosecution. NMSA 1978, 31-27-6(C)(2) (2002).
197. NMSA 1978, § 31-27-6(C)(2) (2002).
198. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, 102, 2 P.3d at 290 ("It is absurd to claim that a person is not punished by
a default forfeiture judgment."). While Nunez provided that a default judgment would preclude a subsequent
criminal prosecution if the two actions were not part of the same proceeding, the court did not address whether or
not default judgments were appropriate in civil forfeiture actions pursued in conjunction with a criminal proceeding,
even though the forfeiture constitutes punishment.
199. Rule 1-055(A) NMRA 2004 ("When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or
otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default."). In contrast, there is no provision found in the rules of criminal
procedure that would allow for punishment without the benefit of an actual hearing.
200. See supra notes 180-194 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
202. See Kim, supra note 12, at 535-36. While the requirement to list the property to be forfeited in the
criminal information would eliminate issues with the attachment of jeopardy and proper initiation under Nunez, it
is not a considerable change from the procedure presently followed. The State followed essentially the same
procedure when filing the criminal charges and civil forfeiture action against Defendant Esparza, naming both the
criminal charges and the property to be forfeited in the criminal information. Esparza,2003-NMCA-075, [ 3, 70
P.3d at 765.
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Under criminal forfeiture, the key alteration would be that the rules of criminal
procedure would apply to both the .criminal prosecution and the forfeiture action.
The application of criminal procedure to all parts of the proceeding would eliminate
the need for bifurcating the forfeiture and the criminal prosecution. Yet, the
requirement that there be a finding of guilt prior to the forfeiture of property could
still be accommodated by a special verdict, indicating a finding of guilt and the
connection of the property to the crime. 2 3 Additionally, the replacement of civil
forfeiture with criminal forfeiture would eliminate the judicial inefficiency
associated with bifurcated proceedings 2°4 and would return to trial court judges the
discretion to determine how a case will proceed through the court. °5
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Esparza marked the first attempt by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
to determine the procedure mandated by Nunez requirement of a "single, bifurcated
proceeding" for civil forfeiture and criminal charges arising from the same
offense. 206 While some practitioners may be disappointed that Esparza did not
establish a specific procedure for the State to follow, the court of appeals was
successful in ensuring that the safeguards against double jeopardy established in
Nunez remained intact. 2 7 However, the question still remains whether Nunez and the
Forfeiture Act should have provided additional protections by requiring criminal
forfeiture in place of the civil forfeiture process established by case law and
legislation. By adopting criminal forfeiture in place of civil forfeiture, New Mexico
courts and the New Mexico Legislature could provide a clearer procedural process
while ensuring that defendants are adequately protected against double jeopardy
violations.2°S

203. See Leach & Malcolm, supra note 9, at 264-65.
204. Under civil forfeiture, evidence pertinent to both the civil forfeiture and the criminal prosecution must
be repeated in the second stage of the trial and the same trier of fact must be present for both proceedings. As a
result, the jury must be held over. For a more in-depth discussion of the advantages of criminal forfeiture, see Leach
& Malcolm, supra note 9, at 264-85.
205. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.

206. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text.

